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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to explore whether there are significant relationships between 
repayments for various types of loans to the economic cycle. Faced with a diminishing 
ability to pay, which loans would a borrower choose to continue to repay? In theory, 
several possible factors are discussed, including the cost of default, ability to pay and 
cost of living. Quarterly repayment data from Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) for eight 
major types of loans were tested for correlation against the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), Consumer Price Index (CPI), and Broad Money Supply (M3). Results show 
significant positive correlations exist between total loan repayments, repayments for 
personal consumption, credit cards and working capital against the GDP, CPI and M3. 
On the other hand, repayment of loans for other purposes shows significant negative 
correlation against the three indicators. Interestingly, repayment for the purchase of 
transport vehicles shows significant positive correlations with the CPI and M3, but not 
the GDP. In conclusion, it is hoped that patterns revealed by the results of this study 
would serve as a useful guide to both the financiers and the borrowers alike in 
planning and allocating their resources more efficiently and effectively in relation to 
the economic cycle. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Eeny, meeny, miny, mo 
Catch a tiger by his toe 
If he hollers let him go 
Eeny, meeny, miny, mo...” 
 
1.1 Purpose 
 
The traditional counting rhyme above has been used by English speaking children 
throughout the ages to choose a person as “it” for games. Culturally, it has also been 
used as a simple tool whenever a “random” choice has to be made, especially when 
the chooser is at a loss as to which item is to be selected. 
 
 By the same token, this paper aims to explore whether there are discernable 
patterns in the choices that borrowers make to repay the various types of loans they 
may have outstanding, in relation to the economic cycle. 
 
 It is a basic economic axiom that the underlying premise in making choices is 
the scarcity of resources. Thus, it is hoped that the knowledge gained from this study 
would assist the parties on both sides of the credit fence:- 
 
 The borrowers, in managing resources for repayments, and 
 The lenders, in managing resources to collect those repayments. 
 
By gaining an insight on the general repayment trends in relation to the 
economic cycle, both parties may be able to allocate their resources more effectively 
and efficiently in order to obtain optimal results. 
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1.2 The Cyclic Nature of the Economy 
 
The economist Joseph A. Schumpeter, in his treatise The Theory of Economic 
Development (OUP, New York, 1961)1, suggested that there are four major business 
(or economic) cycles which may be mapped into a composite model. The component 
cycles are:- 
 The Kondratieff (or Kondratiev) wave – 45 to 60 years 
 The Kuznets infrastructural investment cycle – 15 to 25 years 
 The Juglar fixed investment cycle – 7 to 11 years 
 The Kitchin inventory cycle – 3 to 5 years 
 
The generic term ‘economic cycle’ that is in common use in the industry is the 
one that Schumpeter proposed be named after the French economist that first 
published it in 1860: Clement Juglar. The cycle is characterised by four major phases, 
namely:- 
 i. Expansion – increase in production and prices; low interest rates 
 ii. Crisis – stock exchange crash; corporate insolvencies 
 iii. Recession – decrease in prices and output; high interest rates 
iv. Recovery – stock exchange recovery, contributed by the fall in prices 
and income. 
 
 Periods of growth usually ends with failure of speculative investments built on 
‘bubbles’ of confidence. Periods of contraction and stagnation are essentially the 
‘purging’ of unsuccessful business enterprises. Resources are then transferred to more 
productive uses, which in turn bring about recovery. 
                                               
1
 Business Cycle. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved December 1, 2008. 
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1.3 A Definition of Recession 
 
In their guidebook Managing a Consumer Lending Business, Lawrence and Solomon 
quoted the simplest definition of recession as “two consecutive quarters of decline in 
the GDP (gross domestic product) 2.” This definition is the one that is most commonly 
used in the industry. 
 
 At the time of this writing, Malaysia’s real GDP still managed to grow by 
8.0% from Q1 to Q2 2008. This was followed by a slower growth of 4.9% in Q3, 
20083. Thus, by this technical definition, Malaysia is not yet experiencing a recession. 
Nevertheless, the latest market analysis has already revised the initial Q1 2009 ‘base-
case’ and ‘best-case’ projection of 1.8% and 3.0% respectively to a ‘best-case’ at 
1.8%. The local economy has yet to touch bottom. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW: POSSIBLE FACTORS AFFECTING 
REPAYMENT CHOICES. 
 
In general, each banking institution would have had in place a Risk Management 
department which would periodically assess loan repayment trends and evaluate the 
risks involved. However, the assessment reports produced are proprietary in nature, 
and are for internal circulation only. They are never published. 
 
 That notwithstanding, there are quite a number of academic studies which 
contribute to the knowledge pool. Based on these, and on the author’s own experience, 
the factors which may possibly affect a borrower’s repayment choice may be grouped 
as per the following categories:- 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2
 Lawrence, D. and Solomon, A. (2002). Managing a Consumer Lending Business. New York, U.S.A.: 
Solomon Lawrence Partners. p 257. 
3
 Bank Negara Malaysia  (2008). Monthly Statistical Bulletin, October, 2008. Kuala Lumpur. Table 
5.3.2. 
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2.1 The Cost Factor: Cost of Default 
 
A defaulted loan account will incur additional cost to both the lender and borrower 
alike. Capper (2006)4 examined the quest of a creditor to convert a legal entitlement to 
be paid by way of debt or damages into the actual receipt of payment. Legal remedies 
for the creditor available in Northern Ireland were explored, and the costs attendant to 
the process. Gonzalez (2008) explored aspects of Microfinance in Bolivia, where the 
avoidance of costly alternatives to regular repayment is found to be an incentive 
contributing to the system’s success. 
 
 Locally, the recovery of a defaulted loan account would entail civil or 
foreclosure proceedings (in certain cases, both), which would incur legal fees. The 
cost may range from the minimum of RM35-00 for a legal notice of demand, to 
RM2,000-00 High Court deposit for bankruptcy (civil) or auction (foreclosure). For a 
winding-up petition, the amount is RM2,500-00. It should be noted that the fees would 
accumulate as long as the arrears remain unpaid, as the legal action would escalate. 
 
 In addition to this, the defaulted account would incur additional penalty 
interest on the amount in arrears over and above the contracted rate, which would 
continue to be debited to the account. The penalty rate is usually 1% above the 
contracted rate for loans on periodic rests, or 8% on hire-purchase loans. 
 
 Thus, under this category, a borrower would probably choose to minimise his 
expenses by paying the account with the most expensive potential first, to avoid 
incurring a ballooning cost of default. 
 
2.2 The Liquidity Factor: Ability to Pay 
 
One of the consequences of an economic downturn is the diminishing of discretionary 
income in a household due to rising cost of living or curtailment of earnings, or both.  
In the extreme, loss of earnings may also occur due to ‘down-sizing’ by employers. 
                                               
4
 Capper, D.J.S. (2006). Debt enforcement: The struggle to secure payment. Belfast, U.K.: Queen’s 
University (Doctoral dissertation). 
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 Zhao (2003)5 proposed another determining contributory factor affecting 
household liquidity: credit constraints. Credit-constrained families were more likely to 
be found in a higher debt-burden tier. In addition, due to their risk profile, these 
families may also be saddled with higher interest rates, which add on to their 
repayment burden. 
 
 On the other hand, Stephens, Jr. (2008)6 found that a 10% increase in 
discretionary income after full settlement of a repayment obligation contributed to a 
2% to 3% increase in non-durable consumption.  
 
 In essence, a household would adjust its repayment choices according to its 
ability to pay. Thus, under this category, the borrower would probably select to repay 
the loan with the least cash outflow, in order to optimise his liquidity position. 
 
2.3 The Stigma Factor: Social and Financial ‘Blacklist’ 
 
The defaulter would face two aspects of stigmatisation, namely: social and financial 
‘blacklisting’. 
 
 Socially, a defaulter would have to endure the ignominy of being identified as 
one. In certain cases, denial or aggression would follow. Some desperate cases have 
been known to transfer the blame to the lenders instead. In general, however, 
borrowers are more keen to protect their social standing by avoiding default. Wang 
(2006)7 found that, in the event of an acute repayment problem, consumer behaviour 
shifted from normal choices made based on lifestyle and possessions to that of 
maintaining consumer credibility and being a good credit citizen. Further, in the 
process of extricating themselves from their burden, defaulters engage in a stigma 
management process to cope with the symbolic consequences of the problem. 
                                               
5
 Zhao, J. (2003). Household debt service burden outlook: An exploration on the effect of credit 
constraints. Ohio, U.S.A.: Ohio State University (Doctoral dissertation). 
6
 Stephens, Jr., M. (2008). The consumption response to predictable changes in discretionary income: 
Evidence from the repayment of vehicle loans. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 90 No. 2. 
May, 2008. pp 241-245. Mass. U.S.A.: Mass. Institute of Technology. 
7
 Wang, J. (2006). Consumption of debt: An interpersonal relationship approach. Arizona, U.S.A: 
University of Arizona (Doctoral dissertation). 
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On the financial aspect of blacklisting, Schnabl (2008) discovered that a newly 
introduced regulation in Peru requiring the sharing of information on defaulters 
among lenders had the impact of mitigating adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Borrowers with poor credit history have poorer chances of getting a new credit. As a 
result, lenders are using reputation to screen borrowers, and borrowers adjust their 
loan repayments to maintain their reputation. 
 
 In Malaysia, the advent of Bank Negara Malaysia’s highly comprehensive 
Central Credit Reference Information System (CCRIS) resulted in:- 
 All financial institutions making referencing the system a compulsory step 
in their credit processing, 
 Borrowers with poor credit history being denied access to banking 
facilities (including deposit or checking accounts), 
 Old ‘dead-wood’ accounts coming back to life, as the previously 
untraceable defaulter suddenly reappears to clear his name, to enable a new 
facility to be granted or activated. 
 
As such, under this category, a borrower would choose to continue repayment 
to avoid being ‘blacklisted’. 
 
2.4 The Necessity Factor: Prioritisation of Needs 
 
Despite newer changes in the component categories, the basic percept under Maslow’s 
treatise on the hierarchy of needs remain true: people are motivated to make choices 
based on the prioritisation to satisfy their needs. To apply the concept to repayment 
trends: borrowers will make choices to repay their outstanding loans based on their 
prioritisation to keep the assets or facilities they feel are necessary for their daily 
survival. For example, a sales representative who has to use his car to generate income 
would definitely favour paying his hire-purchase loan over his personal loan. A family 
man with school going children may choose to favour the house to the credit card 
repayment. 
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In essence, the type of loan that will be favoured for repayment will be the one 
in which the borrower cannot do without the credit facility or item financed. 
 
2.5 The ‘Hassle’ Factor: Persistent Follow-up 
 
In their book, Lawrence and Solomon8 emphasised that debt collection is a very 
competitive business, especially in times of economic hardship. This arises due to the 
fact that most borrowers are indebted to multiple lenders for various facilities. When 
liquidity becomes scarce, the lender who is the borrower’s ‘payment of choice’ will be 
the one to benefit. The authors thus urge collection managers to make it their goal to 
be the one to achieve the ‘first call’ to the borrower. This is premised on the concept 
that persistent follow-up will yield consistent results, as the borrower would feel 
motivated to remove the ‘hassle’ as quickly as possible. 
 
 An opposing viewpoint would be those borrowers who deliberately ‘under-
prioritise’ the persistent caller out of a personal sense of injury (to their pride). 
 
 The key determining factor is the collector’s skill in differentiating the former 
form the latter, and using the best method to suit the situation. An experienced and 
highly skilled collector would be effective in developing the rapport necessary to 
deliver consistent results. 
 
 Thus, borrowers would be moved to resolve the issue in order to avoid the 
unpleasantness, or the ‘hassle’ factor. 
                                               
8
 Op cit. pp 139 and 148. 
8 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Problem Definition: Research Questions 
 
This study seeks to ascertain the following:- 
 Are there any significant relationships between repayments to specific 
types of loans to the economic cycle? 
 Is there a significant relationships between total loan repayment to the 
economic cycle? 
 
3.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
The following variables will be used:- 
 
VARIABLE NAME USED TYPE 
Gross Domestic Product GDP Independent 
Consumer Price Index CPI Independent 
Broad Money Supply M3 Independent 
Loan repayment for purchase of 
securities 
SCTY Dependent 
Loan repayment for purchase of 
transport vehicles 
POTV Dependent 
Loan repayment for purchase of 
immovable assets 
ASST Dependent 
Repayment for personal 
consumption loans 
PERS Dependent 
Loan repayment for credit cards CCRD Dependent 
Repayment of loans for 
construction  
CONT Dependent 
Repayment for working capital 
loans 
WCAP Dependent 
Repayment for other purposes OTRS Dependent 
Total Loan repayments TOTL Dependent 
 
Table 1: List of Variables 
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3.3 Methodology 
 
 Secondary statistical data from BNM’s monthly Statistical Bulletins were used 
(Tables 1.4, 1.10.1, 5.2,  5.12) 
 Raw repayment data by loan purpose was regroup into like products to 
facilitate analysis:- 
o SCTY: Loan for purchase of securities 
o POTV: Purchase of transport vehicles 
o ASST: Purchase of property: residential+ non-residential+ other fixed 
assets 
o PERS: Personal consumption: Personal uses+ consumer durables 
o CCRD: Credit cards 
o CONT: Construction 
o WCAP: Working capital 
o OTRS: Other purpose 
o TOTL: Total loan repayment 
 Monthly repayment amounts were aggregated into quarterly subtotals to 
facilitate comparison with GDP9 
 Data keyed into SPSSv15 for Windows. 
 2-tailed Spearman test for correlation carried out, in repetition, against each 
GDP, CPI and M3. 
 
3.4 Limitations: 
 
o BNM’s Data on loan repayment by purpose became available from 
April 2006 onwards, with the implementation of the new Financial 
Reporting and Statistics System (FRSS). 
o Recession is not yet evident in Malaysia. 
o Limited number of data entailed non-parametric Spearman’s test.  
o Repayment data is derived from banking institutions only. 
o Other, non quantifiable factors excluded. 
 
                                               
9
 Refer Appendix 1 
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4. FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Correlation of repayment of specific types of loans against GDP 
 
There are significant positive correlations between the GDP and PERS, CCRD, 
WCAP and TOTL, whereas OTRS shows significant negative correlation. 
 
 SCTY POTV ASST PERS CCRD CONT WCAP OTRS TOTL 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.588 0.527 0.600 0.794* 0.794* - 0.115 0.867* - 0.806* 0.867* 
p-value 0.074 0.117 0.067 0.006 0.006 0.751 0.001 0.005 0.001 
*Correlation is significant at p-value of 0.05 
 
Table 2: Correlation of repayment of specific types of loans against GDP 
 
 
4.2 Correlation of repayment of specific types of loans against CPI 
 
There are significant positive correlations between the CPI and POTV, ASST, PERS, 
CCRD, WCAP and TOTL, whereas OTRS shows significant negative correlation. 
 
 SCTY POTV ASST PERS CCRD CONT WCAP OTRS TOTL 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.612 0.648* 0.636* 0.939* 0.927* - 0.018 0.867* - 0.927* 0.842* 
p-value 0.060 0.043 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.960 0.001 0.000 0.002 
*Correlation is significant at p-value of 0.05 
 
Table 3: Correlation of repayment of specific types of loans against CPI 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
4.3 Correlation of repayment of specific types of loans against M3 
 
There are significant positive correlations between the M3 and POTV, PERS, CCRD, 
WCAP and TOTL, whereas OTRS shows significant negative correlation. 
 
 
 SCTY POTV ASST PERS CCRD CONT WCAP OTRS TOTL 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.600 0.685* 0.612 0.952* 0.952* - 0.006 0.806* - 0.891* 0.806* 
p-value 0.067 0.029 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.987 0.005 0.001 0.005 
*Correlation is significant at p-value of 0.05 
 
Table 3: Correlation of repayment of specific types of loans against M3 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
Based on the above results, it is found that there are significantly strong correlations 
between the GDP and the repayment of loans for personal consumption, credit cards, 
working capital, other purposes, and total loan repayments, with other purposes 
exhibiting a negative correlation. 
 
For the CPI, all the above loan types exhibit the same pattern, with the addition 
of repayment of loans for the purchase of transport vehicles, and fixed assets. These 
variables exhibit relatively strong correlations with the CPI. 
 
Against Broad Money, repayments of loans for the purchase of fixed assets do 
not show a significant correlation. Otherwise, the same variables as for the CPI apply. 
 
It is felt that the results are generally consistent with the economic indicators, 
implying that repayment trends are correlated with the economic cycle.  
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The exceptions, namely repayments for the purchase of securities, loans for 
construction and the negatively correlated loans for other purposes need to be 
explored further in order to identify the likely contributing factors. Likely 
explanations may be linked to the demand for the type loans concerned (e.g. purchase 
of securities), the performance of the sector, non-bank alternative sources of funds, 
and, last but not least, accuracy of data (possibility of misclassification of loan 
purpose as ‘others’ by banking institutions, which gets rectified as the years go by). 
 
It would also be interesting to repeat the study at a later date (in 2010, say), 
when the Malaysian economy would have endured the anticipated downturn, to see 
whether the correlations still hold true. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
As discussed above, it can be concluded that there exist significant correlations in 
most type of loan repayments against the economic indicators. 
 
 With this finding, it is hoped that the lender can manage his resources better by 
fine tuning his efforts to optimise his collection rate in tandem with the economic 
cycle. 
 
 The borrower may also benefit from this, by managing his ability to repay in 
synchronisation with the economic cycle. A simple example would be to proactively 
seek means of restructuring, rescheduling or refinancing a potentially troublesome 
loan before a recession sets in. 
 
 It is hoped that the patterns revealed by the results would serve as useful tool 
for decision making, and perhaps be a platform for further research at a later date. 
 
 At the very least, a much better tool than a children’s rhyme. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table 4: Consolidation of raw data from BNM Monthly Statistical Bulletins 
 
Source: BNM
  GDP CPI M3 SCTY POTV ASST PERS CCRD CONT WCAP OTRS TOTL 
Q2'06 
      
117,194.00  
      
103.80  
      
700,537.80  
     
2,819.30  
    
8,671.60  
   
14,316.00  
    
3,005.80  
    
11,289.90  
       
3,215.50  
   
67,801.90  
   
11,824.40  
   
122,944.10  
Q3'06 
      
121,846.00  
      
104.10  
      
716,265.60  
     
2,542.30  
    
8,085.00  
   
11,053.10  
    
3,103.10  
    
12,425.10  
       
4,056.80  
   
66,791.90  
     
8,115.50  
   
116,172.70  
Q4'06 
      
122,225.00  
      
104.60  
      
760,301.60  
     
2,657.60  
    
8,020.10  
   
11,989.60  
    
3,099.80  
    
13,111.60  
       
3,776.20  
   
69,129.60  
   
10,009.40  
   
121,793.80  
Q1'07 
      
120,225.00  
      
105.00  
      
789,222.50  
     
4,020.40  
    
8,156.70  
   
11,209.70  
    
3,538.60  
    
14,187.40  
       
4,626.40  
   
65,415.30  
     
6,864.90  
   
118,019.30  
Q2'07 
      
123,896.00  
      
105.30  
      
788,610.80  
     
4,281.20  
    
7,983.10  
   
12,089.70  
    
3,105.00  
    
13,043.60  
       
4,374.40  
   
71,771.10  
     
6,366.50  
   
123,014.40  
Q3'07 
      
130,070.00  
      
106.00  
      
804,248.70  
     
5,009.00  
    
8,482.40  
   
12,717.20  
    
3,874.80  
    
14,294.50  
       
4,194.70  
   
68,828.10  
     
6,468.00  
   
123,868.70  
Q4'07 
      
131,162.00  
      
107.10  
      
832,737.80  
   
22,666.30  
    
8,650.40  
   
13,696.90  
    
4,080.50  
    
15,557.50  
       
4,147.70  
   
78,278.00  
     
6,751.30  
   
153,828.60  
Q1'08 
      
129,177.00  
      
107.90  
      
884,372.90  
     
4,567.80  
    
9,045.60  
   
13,782.90  
    
4,689.30  
    
16,500.40  
       
4,117.80  
   
80,392.40  
     
5,822.40  
   
138,918.20  
Q2'08 
      
132,155.00  
      
113.40  
      
899,120.00  
     
4,917.40  
    
9,011.00  
   
15,018.10  
    
4,496.80  
    
15,682.60  
       
3,232.60  
   
81,437.20  
     
5,880.90  
   
139,676.70  
Q3'08 
      
136,235.00  
      
114.70  
      
912,779.90  
     
3,328.60  
    
9,595.30  
   
15,015.20  
    
4,564.70  
    
15,948.90  
       
3,526.50  
   
89,307.00  
     
4,361.20  
   
145,647.60  
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 Table 5: SPSS Spearman’s Correlations against GDP 
 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
     GDP SCTY POTV ASST PERS CCRD CONT WCAP OTRS TOTL 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .588 .527 .600 .794(**) .794(**) -.115 .867(**) -
.806(**) .867(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .074 .117 .067 .006 .006 .751 .001 .005 .001 
GDP 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .588 1.000 .285 .394 .612 .576 .358 .406 -.491 .721(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .074 . .425 .260 .060 .082 .310 .244 .150 .019 
SCTY 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .527 .285 1.000 .830(**) .697(*) .697(*) -.503 .612 -.552 .661(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .117 .425 . .003 .025 .025 .138 .060 .098 .038 
POTV 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .600 .394 .830(**) 1.000 .527 .539 -.612 .758(*) -.527 .770(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .067 .260 .003 . .117 .108 .060 .011 .117 .009 
ASST 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient 
.794(**) .612 .697(*) .527 1.000 .964(**) .091 .733(*) -
.903(**) .745(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .060 .025 .117 . .000 .803 .016 .000 .013 
PERS 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient 
.794(**) .576 .697(*) .539 .964(**) 1.000 .018 .758(*) -
.830(**) .745(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .082 .025 .108 .000 . .960 .011 .003 .013 
CCRD 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient -.115 .358 -.503 -.612 .091 .018 1.000 -.345 -.091 -.164 
Sig. (2-tailed) .751 .310 .138 .060 .803 .960 . .328 .803 .651 
CONT 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient 
.867(**) .406 .612 .758(*) .733(*) .758(*) -.345 1.000 -
.794(**) .855(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .244 .060 .011 .016 .011 .328 . .006 .002 
WCAP 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient -
.806(**) -.491 -.552 -.527 
-
.903(**) -.830(**) -.091 -.794(**) 1.000 -.685(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .150 .098 .117 .000 .003 .803 .006 . .029 
OTRS 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .867(**) .721(*) .661(*) .770(**) .745(*) .745(*) -.164 .855(**) -.685(*) 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .019 .038 .009 .013 .013 .651 .002 .029 . 
Spearman's rho 
TOTL 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
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 Table 6: SPSS Spearman’s Correlations against CPI 
 
      CPI SCTY POTV ASST PERS CCRD CONT WCAP OTRS TOTL 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .612 .648(*) .636(*) .939(**) .927(**) -.018 .867(**) -
.927(**) .842(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .060 .043 .048 .000 .000 .960 .001 .000 .002 
CPI 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .612 1.000 .285 .394 .612 .576 .358 .406 -.491 .721(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .060 . .425 .260 .060 .082 .310 .244 .150 .019 
SCTY 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .648(*) .285 1.000 .830(**) .697(*) .697(*) -.503 .612 -.552 .661(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .043 .425 . .003 .025 .025 .138 .060 .098 .038 
POTV 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .636(*) .394 .830(**) 1.000 .527 .539 -.612 .758(*) -.527 .770(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .048 .260 .003 . .117 .108 .060 .011 .117 .009 
ASST 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient 
.939(**) .612 .697(*) .527 1.000 .964(**) .091 .733(*) -
.903(**) .745(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .060 .025 .117 . .000 .803 .016 .000 .013 
PERS 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient 
.927(**) .576 .697(*) .539 .964(**) 1.000 .018 .758(*) -
.830(**) .745(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .082 .025 .108 .000 . .960 .011 .003 .013 
CCRD 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient -.018 .358 -.503 -.612 .091 .018 1.000 -.345 -.091 -.164 
Sig. (2-tailed) .960 .310 .138 .060 .803 .960 . .328 .803 .651 
CONT 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient 
.867(**) .406 .612 .758(*) .733(*) .758(*) -.345 1.000 -
.794(**) .855(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .244 .060 .011 .016 .011 .328 . .006 .002 
WCAP 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient -
.927(**) -.491 -.552 -.527 
-
.903(**) -.830(**) -.091 -.794(**) 1.000 -.685(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .150 .098 .117 .000 .003 .803 .006 . .029 
OTRS 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .842(**) .721(*) .661(*) .770(**) .745(*) .745(*) -.164 .855(**) -.685(*) 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .019 .038 .009 .013 .013 .651 .002 .029 . 
Spearman's rho 
TOTL 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Table 7: SPSS Spearman’s Correlations against M3 
 
      M3 SCTY POTV ASST PERS CCRD CONT WCAP OTRS TOTL 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .600 .685(*) .612 .952(**) .952(**) -.006 .806(**) -.891(**) .806(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .067 .029 .060 .000 .000 .987 .005 .001 .005 
M3 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .600 1.000 .285 .394 .612 .576 .358 .406 -.491 .721(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .067 . .425 .260 .060 .082 .310 .244 .150 .019 
SCTY 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .685(*) .285 1.000 .830(**) .697(*) .697(*) -.503 .612 -.552 .661(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .029 .425 . .003 .025 .025 .138 .060 .098 .038 
POTV 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .612 .394 .830(**) 1.000 .527 .539 -.612 .758(*) -.527 .770(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .060 .260 .003 . .117 .108 .060 .011 .117 .009 
ASST 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .952(**) .612 .697(*) .527 1.000 .964(**) .091 .733(*) -.903(**) .745(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .060 .025 .117 . .000 .803 .016 .000 .013 
PERS 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .952(**) .576 .697(*) .539 .964(**) 1.000 .018 .758(*) -.830(**) .745(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .082 .025 .108 .000 . .960 .011 .003 .013 
CCRD 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient -.006 .358 -.503 -.612 .091 .018 1.000 -.345 -.091 -.164 
Sig. (2-tailed) .987 .310 .138 .060 .803 .960 . .328 .803 .651 
CONT 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .806(**) .406 .612 .758(*) .733(*) .758(*) -.345 1.000 -.794(**) .855(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .244 .060 .011 .016 .011 .328 . .006 .002 
WCAP 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient -.891(**) -.491 -.552 -.527 -.903(**) -.830(**) -.091 -.794(**) 1.000 -.685(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .150 .098 .117 .000 .003 .803 .006 . .029 
OTRS 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Correlation Coefficient .806(**) .721(*) .661(*) .770(**) .745(*) .745(*) -.164 .855(**) -.685(*) 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .019 .038 .009 .013 .013 .651 .002 .029 . 
Spearman's rho 
TOTL 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
